https://gov.optimism.io/t/anticapture-commission/6889/27?u=kaereste
the anticapture commission proposal does not include a well-defined scope, or any guidance (or supplementary document promising guidance) as to what constitutes `concerns… over significant imbalances of power.` the danger with this type of commission is one of two outcomes: 1) the commission does very little of value, but takes up time and resources, 2) the commission is overzealous in an attempt to justify its own existence. all of this assumes that it is even desirable for specific stakeholders’ or classes of stakeholders’ interests to be deprioritized. traditionally, tokenholders’ interests are supposed to be paramount within a dao. optimism expands on this with its bicameral structure, but it’s not been discussed whether any other organ of governance – including citizens’ house – is appropriately considered a stakeholder in its own right, or a servant of collective tokenholder interests. we would contend that – absent any approved resolution to the contrary – all of governance, from grants council to token house to citizens’ house to any prospective anticapture commission, serve at the behest of, and for the benefit of, tokenholders. to the extent that imbalances of power are not desired, it is between tokenholders themselves. gfx labs does not at this time support an anticapture commission as outlined in this proposal, on grounds that the scope is not defined and we may conceptually disagree with the purpose of the commission as written.
this proposal is crucial for ensuring a balanced power dynamic within the governance system by preventing any single entity from dominating decision-making processes. with implementing such a commission, we can foster a more democratic and transparent environment, promoting trust and collaboration among all stakeholders.
good experiment.
this is a weird one... i don't really understand what is the expected result... but i do think the cause is worthy, and the cost is minimal.... we'll see what emerges
we tend to be supportive of well-scoped experiments that address specific concerns. however, we’re not sure that the experiment is well enough scoped nor do we fully understand the issue and the potential landscape of ideas that could address the issue.
we vote for the introduction of the anticapture commission, but we also provided some critical insights alongside the arguments presented by other delegates. read our thoughts below: https://gov.optimism.io/t/anticapture-commission/6889/26?u=joxes
much needed initiative that is required in this industry
voting for the proposal.
the rationale behind the anticapture commission's requirement of including only previous delegate reward recipients has the intention is to engage delegates with a proven impact. however, we noticed that the rewards criteria in season 4 were heavily centered around vote participation. hence, we are interested in understanding how this correlates with the current delegate rewards criteria, particularly in recognizing impactful contributions beyond voting. furthermore, there are concerns surrounding the long-term structure of the commission and its alignment with the evolving delegate composition and the broader interests of tokenholders. these are critical points that could benefit from further exploration to ensure the commission serves its intended purpose effectively. after a thorough review of the anticapture commission proposal as it stands, we have decided to vote against the current proposal. the existing structure might inadvertently overlook active delegates who are gradually climbing the ranks and are equally committed to fostering balanced governance. a re-evaluation or a more inclusive criterion may better serve the objective of ensuring a well-rounded representation within the anticapture commission, promoting a more equitable governance structure and clearer scope in addressing power imbalances.
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